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Abstract
Before providing an overview of the current situation, Section I of this Essay examines past
trends in the world agricultural trade in order to demonstrate how the share of the world’s agri-
cultural trade from developing and least-developed countries has stagnated compared to those of
the industrialized countries. Section II discusses the factors which have led to this stagnation, in-
cluding one of the most significant factors — the use of export subsidies, as exemplified by CAP.
Section III analyzes the implications of eliminating such protectionism for NFIDCs, which form
the main focus of this Essay. Section IV briefly addresses the implementation of the Uruguay
Round mandate for removal of export subsidies in industrialized countries. Finally, this Essay
concludes by recapitulating the main arguments and analysis within this Essay and offers policy
recommendations based on these conclusions.
THE ELIMINATION OF EXPORT SUBSIDIES
AND THE FUTURE OF NET-FOOD
IMPORTING DEVELOPING
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INTRODUCTION
While the mandated elimination of agricultural export sub-
sidies by the World Trade Organization' ("WTO") is considered
a positive development for net-food exporting countries, it is
commonly perceived as a detriment for net-food importing de-
veloping countries2 ("NFIDCs"). The latter perception in fact
has been sanctified as a pretext for continuing the subsidization
of agriculture in industrialized countries. In this Essay, I ques-
tion the myth of subsidized exports as a solution to the problems
of food security in NFIDCs. In doing so, I examine the implica-
tions, especially for NFIDCs, of the elimination of agricultural
export subsidies in industrialized countries, using the subsidies
within the European Community's Common Agricultural Policy
("CAP") as an example. While recognizing that such elimina-
tion could in the short-term harm consumers of food in NFIDCs,
I argue, in the final analysis, in its favor. I conclude that given
appropriate domestic and international policy measures, a re-
moval of export subsidies in industrialized countries could, inter
alia, promote agricultural production. Contrary to conventional
* Tashi Kaul is a trade economist, currently with the Brussels office of the law firm
White & Case, L.L.P. She specializes in multilateral trade issues and formerly worked at
the World Trade Organization in Geneva. She holds an M.Phil. in Development Eco-
nomics from Cambridge University and a B.A. in Economics from Smith College.
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter WTO Agreement].
2. While several studies conclude that developing countries that are net-food export-
ers would benefit from agricultural trade liberalisation in the North, it is commonly
believed that those that are net-food importers would not. See E. Sadoulet & A. deJanvry,
Growth and Welfare Effects of a GAIT Agreement in Agriculture on the Low Income Countries:
An Integrated Multimarket General Equilibrium Analysis, in AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALI-
ZATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 343-70 (Knudsen & Goldin eds.,
1990) [hereinafter Growth and Welfare Effects]; Rod Tyers & Kym Anderson, How De-
veloping Countries Could Gain from Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round, in
AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra
at 41-70.
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arguments, the increase in agricultural production could occur
not only in developing countries that are net-food exporters, but
also in those countries that are net-food importers, thereby in-
creasing, rather than decreasing, food security in each of the two
categories.
A Discussion Paper submitted by a developing country dele-
gation to the WTO as part of the on-going agricultural negotia-
tions mirrors this view.' This paper, in part, states: "Far from
being a permanent solution for concerns with food security, the
perpetuation of export subsidies constitutes, in fact, a special
and differential treatment in favour of some rich developed
countries."4 The use of export subsidies typically leads to an
over-supply of agricultural commodities, artificially depressing
prices at the cost of more efficient producers elsewhere. The
subsidizing country, therefore, can begin to specialize in indus-
tries where it actually holds a comparative disadvantage, a phe-
nomenon better known as "trade diversion."
Industrialized countries began organizing themselves in the
1950s into regional free trade areas and customs unions in order
to claim larger trade shares in the world agricultural market.
Developing countries have also started organizing themselves
into trade blocs-the Common Market for Eastern and South-
ern Africa ("COMESA"), the South Asian Association for Re-
gional Cooperation ("SAARC"), and the Association of South-
East Asian Nations ("ASEAN")-sometimes even with industrial-
ized countries, such as the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment ("NAFTA"). However, while most industrial economy
trade blocs practice agricultural protectionism, developing econ-
omies in fact have taxed agriculture in order to finance and pro-
tect industry. Regional trade blocs and protectionist barriers
against non-members, therefore, have enabled industrialized
countries, despite their inherent comparative disadvantage in ag-
riculture, to convert themselves from net-importers to net-ex-
porters of food.
In the past four decades, sovereign governments have taken
advantage of the ambiguity of the General Agreement on Tariffs
3. Export Subsidies-Food Security or Food Dependency?, Discussion Paper presented by
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay, G/AG/NG/W/38
(Sept. 27, 2000).
4. Id.
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& Trade5 ("GATT") rules on agriculture. The fact that until only
recently agriculture had been exempted from most of the
clauses under the GATT, the primary vehicle promoting free
trade, demonstrates the special treatment rendered agriculture.6
In the past, there was no support from the developed countries
for the inclusion of agriculture on the liberalization agenda.
The United States and the major industrialized countries of Eu-
rope in pursuit of self-sufficiency in agriculture were generally
captive to strong protectionist lobbies that had constructed elab-
orate mechanisms of agricultural income support. The United
States, for instance, sought and received a waiver in 1955 from
the obligations of GATT under Article II and XI, for action
taken under Section 22 of Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,
as subsequently amended.7 Since 1935, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture used Section 35 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
to restrict imports that interfered with U.S. farmers' interests.
The United States used a variety of measures, together with an
assortment of trade restrictions, to support prices or subsidize
farmers.8 The U.S. Agricultural Adjustment Act also allowed the
use of export subsidies for stimulating exports of agricultural
products.' Since the 1950s, industrialized countries have fol-
lowed their own agricultural interests arbitrarily, frequently
flouting the general guidelines of GATT, negligent of the result-
ing distortions created in the international agricultural trading
system.
In its agenda for liberalization, the Uruguay Round 0
("UR') of multilateral trade negotiations, however, addressed
agriculture, with more defined rules on export subsidies. The
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
6. Loopholes for agriculture were written into Articles XI and XVI from the start.
SeeJ. BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM (1988).
7. REMYJURENAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. AGRICULTURAL IMPORT PROTECTION
AND GATT NEGOTIATIONS, Brief No. 1B92029, available at http://www.gwjapan.com/
ftp/pub/policy/crs/1993/93.bl 1 1.txt.
8. The price support system deployed by the United States covered almost all ma-
jor commodities viz., wheat, coarse grains, cotton, rice, soybean, dairy products,
groundnut, and tobacco.
9. A. HODA, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM 194
(1987).
10. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VO1.
1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
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implementation of the UR mandate on export subsidies is the
subject of on-going agricultural negotiations in the WTO.
Before providing an overview of the current situation, I examine
in Section I past trends in the world agricultural trade in order
to demonstrate how the share of the world's agricultural trade
from developing and least-developed countries ("LDCs") has
stagnated compared to those of the industrialized countries. In
Section II, I discuss the factors which have led to this stagnation,
including one of the most significant factors-the use of export
subsidies, as exemplified by CAP. In Section III, I analyze the
implications of eliminating such protectionism for NFIDCs,
which form the main focus of this Essay. In Section IV, I briefly
address the implementation of the Uruguay Round mandate for
removal of export subsidies in industrialized countries. Finally,
in the conclusion, I recapitulate the main arguments and analy-
sis within this Essay and offer policy recommendations based on
these conclusions.
I. TREDNS IN THE WORLD AGRICULTURE TRADE:
1960-1980 & 1980-1997
From 1960-1980, the average rate of growth of trade in agricul-
tural commodities (4.3%) was relatively higher than that of world
agricultural production (2.5%). The rate of growth of agricultural
exports continued to exceed agricultural output from 1980-
1997." Between 1990-1997, the volume of world merchandise
exports of agricultural products increased by 37%, compared to
a 15% increase in world agricultural output. 12
A. Industrialized And Developing Countries' Shares Of World
Exports: 1967-1997
From 1967-1980, export shares of countries in the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD"),
on average, tended to increase (0.8%). LDC export market
shares, in contrast, reflected an average decline (0.5%). Inter-
estingly, the one commodity for which LDC average annual
shares decreased significantly, namely feedgrains, happened to be
1. Except between 1980-1985 when output growth was higher.
12. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO ANNUAL REPORT: INTERNATIONAL
TRADE STATISTICS 1998 (1997) [hereinafter WTO Annual Report].
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the very commodity for which OECD shares increased the most.'3
Consistently, the very commodity for which OECD shares de-
creased the most (i.e., oilseeds), increased significantly in LDC
shares.1 4
This negative correlation between the magnitude of export
shares of OECD and LDC countries is an established relation-
ship that extends to several other commodities, and it has been
systematically proven. 5 For instance, the share of agricultural
raw materials, which comprises the traditional export crops of
many LDCs, tended to increase for the OECD while correspond-
ingly declining for LDCs.
An example that illustrates well the growing trade shares of
industrialized countries at the expense of LDCs is the European
Economic Community ("EEC") and its gradual takeover of the
world sugar market. The European Community's Common Ag-
ricultural Policy has eroded the market share of LDC producers
and, thus, has significantly reduced their export revenues. The
first Lom6 Convention" in 1975 had guaranteed some develop-
ing countries substantial sugar quotas. The EEC, ignoring these
quotas, continued to increase its domestic sugar production past
the stage of self-sufficiency and became a significant world sugar
exporter. From 1974-1982, the EEC's share of world sugar im-
ports fell from 10% in 1974 to 4.8% in 1982. Correspondingly,
the EEC's share of world sugar exports increased from 5.1% in
1974 to a substantial 18.3% in 1982. The sugar example is one
of many cases where industrialized countries' export shares grew
at the cost of those of LDCs, in effect, gradually "diverting" trade
away from relatively low-cost, efficient producers.
Table 1 shows the trade shares from 1980-1997 of fifteen
leading food exporters, which were primarily industrialized
countries with the exception of Argentina, Brazil, China, and
Thailand. In 1990, Western Europe and North America claimed
13. A 1.9% increase in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") feedgrain shares for a 1.4% decrease in least-developed countries ("LDC")
feedgrain shares.
14. There was a 1.5% decrease in OECD oilseed shares for a corresponding 1.7 %
increase in LDC shares.
15. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, AGRICULTURAL
TRADE WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1984) [hereinafter Agricultural Trade].
16. European Economic Community-African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries
Convention ("ACP-EEC Convention"), Feb. 28, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 596 [hereinafter Lom6
I].
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TABLE 1
LEADING EXPORTERS AND IMPORTERS OF AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTS, 1997 (Billion dollars and percentage)
Value Share in world exports/imports
1997 1980 1990 1997
Exporters
United States 77.27 17.1 14.3 13.3
France 41.51 6.9 9.0 7.2
Netherlands 35.36 5.7 1 7.7 6.1
Canada 33.09 5.0 5.4 5.7
Germany 28.80 4.2 5.9 5.0
United Kingdom 20.88 3.1 3.6 3.6
Australia 18.80 3.3 2.9 3.2
Belgium-lunxembourg 18.74 2.4 3.2 3.2
Brazil 18.30 3.4 2.4 3.2
I taly 16.72 2.1 2.9 2.9
Spain* 16.60 1.4 2.3 2.9
China 15.73 1.5 2.4 2.7
Argentina 13.56 1.9 1.8 2.3
Thailand 12.64 1.2 1.9 2.2
Denmark 12.55 2.1 2.6 2.2
TOTAL 380.56 61.3 68.2 65.6
Importers
Japan 67.10 9.4 11.0 10.7
United States 61.83 8.5 8.7 9.9
Germany 48.97 9.5 10.3 7.8
United Kingdom 35.50 6.4 6.5 5.7
France 32.32 5.9 6.3 5.2
Italy 32.21 6.2 6.8 5.1
Netherlands 21.35 4.2 4.1 3.4
Belgium-Luxembourg 18.55 3.1 3.2 3.0
Spain* 17.15 1.8 2.7 2.7
Hong Kong, China 14.64 1.2 1.8 2.3
Retained imports 8.06 0.9 1'0 1.3
China 14.63 1.9 1.7 2.3
Canada** 13.66 1.7 2.0 2.2
Korea, Rep. Of 13.54 1.5 2.1 2.2
Russian Fed.* 13.25 - 2.1
Taipei, Chinese 9.78 1.1 1.4 1.6
Above 15 407.89 62.1 67.8 65.1
* Includes Secretariat
estimates.
** Imports arc valued f.o.b.
Source: WTO Annual Report, "International Trade Statistics, 1998."
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the major share of world agricultural exports (45.3% and 19.7%
respectively). By 1997, however, Asia's claim of 19.6% of world
agricultural exports surpassed North America's (19.0%) and per-
formed much better than Latin America (11.9%), Africa (3.7%),
and the Middle East (1.0%). In 1997, developed countries ac-
counted for 65% of the total value of world agricultural exports,
developing countries 31.2%, and economies in transition
3.7%.17 These figures indicate that industrialized countries' ag-
ricultural export shares continued to dominate the world agri-
cultural market in the 1990s. The successful performance of the
newly industrialized countries ("NICs"), however, had signifi-
cantly raised Asia's share of world agricultural exports in the
1990s.
Although Asia's share of world agricultural exports has in-
creased from 1990-1997, it must be noted that this increase is
attributable only to an increase in its exports within Asia.
Asia's exports to industrialized regions, like Western Eu-
rope, as a share of world exports fell, while its exports to North
America remained stagnant from 1990-1997. Similarly, the share
of world agricultural exports of Latin America, Central and East-
ern Europe, and Africa to Western Europe and North America
also remained stagnant from 1990-1997. According to a recent
WTO study, Western Europe's share of the total agricultural ex-
ports from developing countries declined from 30.5% in 1990 to
28% in 1998. Western Europe is by far the most important de-
veloped country market for agricultural exports from developing
countries. The share of developing countries' exports to desti-
nations other than Australia, Japan, New Zealand, North
America, and Western Europe, in contrast, rose from 39.5% in
1990 to 43% in 1998.18
B. OECD And Developing Country Shares Of World Imports:
1967-1997
From 1967-1980, OECD agricultural import shares, on the
whole, tended to fall. Like export shares, the import shares of
LDCs and OECD countries also were negatively correlated. An
17. See WTO Annual Report, supra note 12.
18. See Statement by India, Second Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture,
G/AG/NG/w/33 (july 13, 2000).
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TABLE 2
EXPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS BY REGION, 1997
(Billion dollars and percentage)
Value World exports Annual percentage change
1997 1990 1997 1990-97 1996 1997
Western Europe
World 237.9 45.3 41.0 3 0 -4
Western Europe 177.6 35.4 30.6 3 -1 -6
C./E. Europe/
Baltic States/CIS 15.8 1.4 2.7 16 14 4
Asia 14.6 2.2 2.5 7 2 -2
North America 10.8 2.1 1.9 3 8 6
Africa 7.9 1.8 1.4 0 -12 0
Middle East 6.4 1.4 1.1 1 0 -2
Latin America 3.9 0.7 0.7 4 -18 1
Asia
World 113.6 17.4 19.6 7 3 2
Asia 73.8 9.9 12.7 9 4 1
Western Europe 16.3 3.0 2.8 4 2 0
North America 11.8 2.0 2.0 5 3 7
Middle East 4.7 0.9 0.8 3 6 2
Africa 2.9 0.5 0.5 6 -6 8
C./E. Europe/
Baltic States/CIS 2.2 0.9 0.4 -7 -4 8
Latin America 1.8 0.3 0.3 8 19 10
North America
World 110.4 19.7 19.0 4 1 -3
Asia 39.7 7.6 6.8 3 -4 -10
North America 30.1 4.2 5.2 8 7 9
Western Europe 17.8 4.0 3.1 1 -9 -1
Latin America 13.4 1.7 2.3 10 20 1
Africa 3.4 0.6 0.6 4 -6 -6
Middle East 3.3 0.6 0.6 3 -3 3
C./E. Europe/
Baltic States/CIS 2.3 0.9 0.4 -6 56 -17
Latin America
World 68.8 9.6 11.9 8 5 12
Western Europe 22.5 3.2 3.9 8 0 17
North America 17.0 2.5 2.9 7 6 10
Latin America 12.0 1.1 2.1 15 11 5
Asia 10.5 1.0 1.8 15 2 13
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C./E. Europe/
Baltic States/CIS 2.4 1.3 0.4 -10 30 24
Middle East 2.3 0.3 0.4 9 11 14
Africa 2.1 0.2 0.4 11 7 2
C./E. Europe/
Baltic States/CIS
World 21.9 3.0 3.8 8 3 0
Western Europe 11.4 1.9 2.0 5 -2 -1
C./E. Europe/
Baltic States/CIS 5.1 0.4 0.9 16 3 10
Asia 3.0 0.4 0.5 10 2 -4
Middle East 0.8 0.0 0.1 21 21 4
North America 0.6 0.1 0.1 8 62 -23
Africa 0.5 0.1 0.1 4 -5 3
Latin America 0.1 0.1 0.0 -18 13 -36
Africa
World 21.7 3.9 3.7 4 4 0
Western Europe 11.8 2.4 2.0 2 -3 -3
Asia 4.0 0.6 0.7 7 7 2
Africa 2.8 0.5 0.5 5 4 6
North America 1.1 0.2 0.2 4 25 1
C./E. Europe/
Baltic States/CIS 0.6 0.1 0.1 1 -2 -3
Middle East 0.5 0.1 0.1 4 17 1
Latin America 0.4 0.0 0.1 31 92 16
Middle East
World 5.7 1.1 1.0 3 5 -9
Western Europe 2.3 0.5 0.4 1 10 -5
Middle East 2.0 0.2 0.3 10 4 -5
Asia 0.6 0.1 0.1 11 -12 5
All other regions 0.7 0.2 0.1 -3 8 -5
World exports 579.9 100.0 100.0 5 1 -1
Source: WTO Annual Report, "International Trade Statistics, 1998."
increasing import share of LDCs in world trade is strongly associ-
ated with an increasing share for OECDs for all commodities ex-
cept foodgrains.' 9 For the OECD, the decline in average annual
imports (1.1%) exceeded the increase in average annual exports
(0.8%). For LDCs, the increase in import share (0.6%) ex-
ceeded the decline in export share (0.5%). In 1982, LDCs be-
gan importing more agricultural products than they exported af-
19. See Agricultural Trade, supra note 15.
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ter years of running a trade surplus, implying a decline in their
net share of world trade. LDCs as a whole experienced a 14%
decline in export earnings between 1980-82, while their imports
remained at the same level.2" Data on Latin America shows that
the value of agricultural imports rose from US$15,900,000,000 in
1990 to US$21,180,000,000 in 1993, while that of agricultural ex-
ports remained almost stagnant-US$39,250,000,000 in 1990 to
US$39,020,000,000 in 1993. Similarly, data on Africa shows that
the value of agricultural imports increased from
US$15,680,000,000 in 1990 to US$16,120,000,000 in 1993, while.
the value of agricultural exports remained stagnant-,
US$15,450,000,000 in 1990 to US$15,300,000,000 in 1993. Data
on Western Europe, by contrast, shows that the value of agricul-
tural imports changed little, from US$208,230,000,000 in 1990
to US$209,080,000,000 in 1993, while the value of agricultural
exports increased substantially, from US$187,660,000,000 in 1990
to US$196,560,000,000 in 1993.21
Table 3, for instance, shows that food imports for Western
Europe from Africa as a percentage of total food imports fell
from 8.1% in 1982 to 4.5% in 1992, and that food imports from
Latin America fell from 11.9% in 1980 to 9.3% in 1992. Agricul-
tural trade within industrialized countries, however, has been on
the rise. Food imports from Western Europe itself as a share of
total food imports, for instance, increased from 55.5% in 1982 to
71.5% in 1992. In 1997, 70.5% of the total value of developed
country agricultural imports originated from other developed
countries, 26.5% from developing countries, and 3% from econ-
omies in transition.22 In the following section, I examine why
LDCs and other developing countries should have started im-
porting agricultural commodities that they had traditionally ex-
ported.
20. Mj. Roarty, The EEC Common Agricultural Policy and its Effects on Less Developed
Countries, NAT'L WESTMINSTER BANK Q. REV. (1985).
21. WTO SECRETARIAT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: TRENDS AND STATISTICS (1994)
22. See WTO Annual Report, supra note 12.
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TABLE 3
IMPORTS OF FOOD INTO NORTH AMERICA, WESTERN
EUROPE AND ASIA BY REGION, 1980-1992 (Percentage)
C./E.
Europe
Origin North Latin Western and the Middle
Destination Year America America Europe f. USSR Africa East Asia World
Shares
North
America 1980 16.8 36.9 18.1 1.2 6.6 0.2 20.2 100.0
1985 18.2 33.7 23.6 0.9 4.3 0.5 18.6 100.0
1990 23.1 31.7 21.4 1.0 2.1 0.3 20.4 100.0
1991 24.6 30.1 20.9 0.9 2.2 0.3 21.0 100.0
1992 26.3 28.7 20.4 0.8 1.9 0.3 21.7 100.0
Western
Europe 1980 14.8 11.9 55.5 2.1 8.1 0.9 6.6 100.0
1985 9.2 13.2 60.5 2.2 7.5 1.0 6.4 100.0
1990 6.3 9.9 69.4 2.7 5.0 1.0 5.5 100.0
1991 5.8 9.7 70.6 2.5 4.8 0.9 5.5 100.0
1992 6.0 9.3 71.5 2.4 4.5 0.8 5.5 100.0
Asia 1980 40.6 5.2 7.2 0.6 4.0 0.2 42.3 100.0
1985 37.2 5.7 8.1 0.7 2.5 0.2 44.7 100.0
1990 36.0 5 12.1 1.0 2.3 0.3 42.3 100.0
1991 32.7 5.3 12.8 1.3 2.1 0.3 45.4 100.0
1992 33.3 5.2 12.7 1.6 1.9 0.3 45.0 100.0
Source: GATT (1994), Trends and Statistics: International Trade
II. DETERMINANTS OF CHANGES IN TRADE VOLUME AND
TRADE SHARES:23 THE USE OF EXPORT SUBSIDIES
IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
A. Conceptual Framework: Aggregate Economic Welfare, Implications
of an Export Subsidy in the Domestic Market
Consider a perfectly competitive market with respect to pro-
23. Another primary reason behind increasing export shares of industrialized
countries relative to those of developing countries lies in the higher income elasticity of
demand for their exports; in particular, animal products and the feedgrains used to
produce animal products. The rapid growth of world income in the last two decades
has increased the demand for industrialized country exports as opposed to a stagnation
and variability for developing country primary exports. In some developing countries,
overvalued exchange rates and/or policies that favor consumers over producers and
industry over agriculture have also served to depress agricultural production.
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duction, consumption, and trading. The following is a basic par-
tial equilibrium analysis of the effects on aggregate economic
welfare of an export subsidy.24
GRAPH 1
EFFECTS OF AN EXPORT SUBSIDY
Price
P*s
S
a c dl
e\
Q3 Q1 Q2 Q4 Quantity
4
Producer gain: a + b + c
Consumer Loss: a + b
Cost of Govt. Subsidy: b + c + d + e + f + g
With the imposition of the export subsidy:
1) Price in the exporting country rises from Pw to Ps, so that
domestic producers have an incentive to increase production.
There also is a concomitant fall in price in the importing coun-
try from Pw to Ps*.
2) In the exporting country, producers gain a + b + c, con-
sumers lose a + b, and the government loses b + c + d + e + f + g.
The area below the price and above the supply curve gives the
24. See Graph 1.
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producer gain. The area below the demand curve and above the
price curve gives the consumer loss. Government loss is
equivalent to the expenditure on the subsidy.
3) The sum of all the above-mentioned areas,
b + d + e + f + g, gives the net welfare loss, of which b and d
represent consumption and production losses, respectively.
4) There is a resultant decline in the terms of trade owing to
the decline of the price of the export in the world market, im-
plicit in a decline in the world market price from Pw to Ps*. The
terms of trade loss imposes an additional cost amounting to
e + f + g, which is equal to Pw - Ps, or Q4 - Q3. The cost of an
export subsidy in terms of aggregate economic welfare, there-
fore, clearly exceeds its benefits.
B. Export Subsidies under CAP
The increasing shares of industrialized countries in agricul-
tural trade, relative to developing countries, can be largely attrib-
uted to growing protectionism and regionalism in the north.
This trend has led industrialized countries to trade largely among
themselves rather than with developing countries. Table 3 illus-
trates that shares of food imports into Western Europe and
North America from Western Europe and North America in-
creased from 1980-1992, while those from Latin America and
Asia decreased significantly. In 1997, imports of food into the
European Union from Western Europe accounted for 69.7% of
total food imports flowing into the region, compared to 10.2%
from Latin America, 5.9% from Asia, and 5.1% from Africa.
25
The composition of major regional flows in world agricultural
exports in 1997 indicates that intra-Western Europe trade ac-
counted for 30.6% of the total world agricultural export flows.
By contrast, trade flows from Asia to Western Europe accounted
for only 2.8%, while trade flows from Latin America to Western
Europe accounted for 3.9%.26
An analysis of the mechanisms of CAP helps clarify the im-
pact of protectionism on world agricultural markets. The EC
formulated CAP as a protectionist support mechanism for Euro-
pean farmers in order to guarantee them high prices by having
the EC buy agricultural products when prices fell below specified
25. See Table 4.
26. See Table 2.
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TABLE 4
IMPORTS OF FOOD INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION, NORTH
AMERICA AND SELECTED ASIAN ECONOMIES BY REGION,
1990-1997 (Billion dollars and percentage)
Value Share
1997* 1997*
European Union (15)
World 203.88 100.0
Western Europe 142.04 69.7
Latin America 20.86 10.2
Asia 12.12 5.9
North America 12.07 5.9
Africa 10.41 5.1
C./E. Europe/Baltic States/CIS 4.59 2.3
Middle East 1.47 0.7
North America**
World 55.55 100.0
Latin America 17.24 31.0
North America 15.45 27.8
Western Europe 10.60 19.1
Asia 10.29 18.5
Africa 1.18 2.1
C./E. Europe/Baltic States/CIS 0.60 1.1
Middle East 0.18 0.3
* Or nearest year.
** Imports of Canada are valued f.o.b.
The latest year for which data are complete is 1996. The figures include significant
imports for re-exports.
Source: WTO Annual Report, "International Trade Statistics, 1998."
support levels. This policy was complemented by the imposition
of tariffs amounting to the difference between domestic and
world agricultural prices, in order to prevent the inflow of im-
ports and to level prices.
CAP was later transformed into a massive export subsidy
scheme, since the initial support scheme resulted in an accumu-
lation of massive stockpiles of food. By 1985, European stocks
amounted to 780,000 tons of beef, 1,200,000 tons of butter, and
1,200,000 tons of wheat. Promoting exports through subsidiza-
tion, therefore, was perceived as the best way of disposing of sur-
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plus production. The costs from subsidizing were estimated at
approximately US$15,000,000,000 annually. 27
Agricultural support pricing under CAP, as illustrated in
Graph 2, sets domestic prices not only above the world price that
would have existed in its absence, but also above the domestic
equilibrium price. Therefore, in the case of CAP, not only do
export subsidy support prices perform the conventional role of
subsidizing and, in effect, promoting exports, but also of "divert-
ing" trade towards the EC by converting them from food import-
ers into food exporters. At free trade world market prices, the
EC would in fact be a food importer. Graph 2 illustrates how
under free trade, Europe would be importing quantity M' - M.
With the export subsidy, it is now exporting quantity X' - X.
Agricultural support in the form of producer and export
subsidies, import levies, etc. increases domestic consumer prices
and agricultural output and depresses domestic demand in the
EC. The output surplus created, in turn, reduces world prices
and distorts the relative prices of agricultural and manufactured
goods. This phenomenon has undermined the export earnings
of many low-cost, efficient agricultural commodity producing de-
veloping countries.
III. IMPACT OF EXPORT SUBSIDY ELIMINATION ON NFIDCS
A withdrawal of agricultural support in industrialized coun-
tries would reduce the surplus in output and, thereby, raise
world prices of agricultural commodities.2" The removal of sub-
sides under CAP, for instance, would induce two key changes.
First, domestic EC agricultural prices would fall from artificially
raised levels. Second, the resultant decline in EC agricultural
output would exert an upward pressure on the free trade world
prices. That this rise in world prices would benefit developing
countries that are net-exporters of agricultural commodities via
terms of trade improvement is an established fact. The issue is
the perception that higher food prices would harm the interests
of NFIDCs. This view, in fact, has served as an excuse for indus-
27. P. KRUGMAN & M OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY
207 (3d ed. 1994).
28. An overall world price increase for cereals, meat products, and sugar is esti-
mated to range between 10% to 30%. See Growth and Welfare Effects, supra note 2.
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GRAPH 2
EXPORT SUBSIDIES UNDER THE CAP
I 'ISPrice
Support Price
C
a b d
World Price e
X M M' X' Quantity
Producer gain: a + b + c
Consumer Loss: a + b
Cost of Govt. Subsidy: b + c + d + e + f + g
Net Welfare Loss: b + d + e + f + g
trialized countries to continue subsidizing agriculture. 29 Higher
prices, however, could significantly benefit NFIDCs. The impli-
cation of higher prices for a NFIDC depends significantly on
whether its imports are substitutable for domestic produce or not.
So far, imports have been cheaper than domestic substitutes,
precisely the reason why NFIDCs choose to import food rather
than promote production. However, if prices of imports rise
higher than the prices of domestic substitutes, NFIDCs would
29. Tyers and Anderson estimate a 11.8% decline in GNP of developing countries
and a 28.2% gain in that of industrial market economies as a result of industrial country
liberalization. See Tyers & Anderson, supra note 2.
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find more economic sense in substituting imports with domestic
production. Due to substitutability for imports, the increase in
world prices transmits itself to domestic prices, raising domestic
producer prices significantly. The resulting improvement in terms
of trade for agriculture would raise domestic production. Pro-
duction of domestic substitutes could in fact be raised to such a
level that NFIDCs could well begin exporting these commodi-
ties. The perception that all net-food importing developing coun-
tries would inevitably lose out from such a price rise via increases
in food expenditure or reduction in food availability overlooks
the extent to which import substitutability could counteract the
impact of the increase in world prices on domestic food availabil-
ity.
A. Impact of Increase in World Prices on NFJDCs: A Graphical
Analysis in Partial Equilibrium.
1. Scenario 1, Country A
In Graph 3, Country A is a net-food importing country
where imports are substitutable with domestic production. For con-
ceptual clarity, it is assumed that domestic production is a perfect
substitute for imports in the domestic market so that the im-
ported commodity M and its substitute share identical supply-
demand functions. In this case, the price differential between
the world price and the domestic equilibrium price will not be
large, and it is possible that an increase in the world price could
bring it to exceed the domestic equilibrium price. Country A in
that case would not import commodity M any more.
In Graph 3, at world price level, Pw, it is cheaper for Coun-
try A to practice free trade and to import the quantity M' - M
than to produce domestically. However, if world prices rise to
Pw, thereby exceeding the domestic equilibrium price Pe, Coun-
try A would now find it cheaper to substitute imports with do-
mestic production. Import-substitution, therefore, would make
perfect economic sense for Country A, since the higher world
food prices would not lower its domestic food availability.
2. Scenario 2, Country B
In Graph 4, Country B is a net-food importer with non-substi-
tutable imports. Since the imported commodity cannot be pro-
duced domestically, the price differential between domestic
2000]
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GRAPH 3
SCENARIO I
M M'
Country A
Imports are Substitutable
equilibrium price, Pe, and the world price, Pw, is very high.
Contrary to scenario 1, there is low or no probability of world
prices exceeding domestic prices. This implies that it will almost
always be cheaper for Country B to continue importing despite
the price rise. Due to resulting macroeconomic changes de-
scribed in Africa I, Country B actually would end up allocating
resources towards promoting exports of other agricultural com-
modities or "doing what they are best at" in order to earn for-
eign exchange to meet the demands of rising import bill for
commodity M.
This argument is consistent with the simulation findings of
Sadoulet and de Janvry,3 ° who constructed general equilibrium
models to study the impact on poor cereal importers of a 20%
increase in world prices of cereals and animal products following
30. See Sadoulet & de Janvry, supra note 2.
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GRAPH 4
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OECD liberalization.31 They contrasted African countries where
cereal imports are not substitutable with domestic production
(Africa I) with African & Asian countries where cereal imports
are substitutable (Africa II & Asia)."
The authors reach important conclusions about how import
substitutability could counteract the potential negative effects of
an increase in world prices on domestic food availability. They
found that the producer prices of wheat, rice, and corn in the
domestic market follow the price of cereal imports. The impact
of a price increase of imported cereal on domestic producer and
consumer prices of food crops will depend fundamentally on the
degree of substitutability between imported cereals (wheat, rice,
31. These poor cereal importers are low-income countries that, in the World Bank
classification, had per capita incomes below US$500 in 1985.
32. Africa I: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Ghana, Lesotho,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, and Togo. Africa II: Benin, Ethio-
pia, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Tanzania.
Asia: Bangladesh, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, and Sri Lanka.
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and corn) and domestic food crops (wheat, rice, corn, and other
food crops). More generally, the effect of an increase in interna-
tional cereal prices on domestic producer prices of crops will
depend on (i) the elasticity of substitution in consumption be-
tween domestic food crops and cereal imports, (ii) import de-
pendency ratio of food crops, and (iii) supply and demand elas-
ticities. Alternatively stated, an increase in international cereal
prices will have a relatively small effect on the producer prices of
food crops if (i) domestic production is a poor substitute for im-
ports, (ii) the share of imports is small, or (iii) the supply elastic-
ity is large.
Consumer prices, by contrast, always increase. The rise,
however, is higher with higher substitutability, with a greater
share of imports, and with a lower demand elasticity for domes-
tic food production. Additionally, given adequate sub-
stitutability, the rise in consumer prices is smaller given a higher
supply elasticity for domestic food production.
In sum, Sadoulet and deJanvry conclude that an increase in
world prices would be transmitted on to domestic producer and
consumer prices if the imports are substitutable. The degree of
price transmission would depend on, among other things, the
degree of substitutability. The resulting increase in domestic
prices then would encourage import substitution through do-
mestic food production, thereby lowering the possibility of a de-
cline in food availability due to more expensive food imports.
3. Simulation Results
33
The most significant macroeconomic impact is reflected in
the rising food import bills and exchange rate depreciation in
Africa I, where imports are non substitutable, and the opposite in
Africa II and Asia, where imports, by contrast, are substitutable.
a. Africa I: Non-Substitutable Imports
In the short-run, domestic food prices, due to non-sub-
stitutability of food imports with domestic produce, rise by only
3% in response to the 20% world food price increase. Consump-
tion of both imported and domestically produced food, there-
fore, falls by 2.3%. However, the 20% rise in the price of im-
33. See Table 7.
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TABLE 5
IMPACT OF A 20% INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF CEREALS
AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS ON THE POOR AFRICAN AND
ASIAN COUNTRIES (Percent changes over base values)
Long-run
Africa I Africa II Asia effects Asia
Macroeconomy
GDP at market prices -0.3 -1.0 -0.8 -1.5
Absorption -0.8 -1.4 -1.0 -1.6
International Trade
Nominal Exchange Rate 0.7 -2.4 -4.8 -4.9
Agricultural Exports 0.6 -2.1 -3.9 -4.5
Cereal Imports -10.7 -24.9 -76.7 -76.9
Producer prices
Agri terms of trade -0.4 2.0 5.3 5.0
Price of agriexports 0.7 -2.4 -3.5 -3.4
Price of food crops 0.1 5.9 8.8 8.6
Price of other agriculture -1.6 -1.9 2.1 1.9
Agricultural production
Total Agriculture 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.3
Agri exports 0.6 -2.0 -2.3 -2.7
Foodcrops 0.0 1.6 2.9 2.3
Other Agriculture -0.4 -0.2 0.1 -0.5
Real Incomes
Landless and small farmers -2.0 -0.9 -2.5 -3.0
Medium farmers -1.5 -1.6 0.1 -0.5
Large farmers -0.4 -0.5 5.2 4.3
Urban poor -0.7 -2.0 -2.6 -3.1
Urban rich -0.7 -1.7 -2.0 -2.6
Consumption
Food consumption -2.3 -3.2 -3.7 -4.3
Consumer Price of food 3.0 7.3 9.0 8.8
Source: Sadoulet & Janvry (1992)
ports outweighs the reduction in volume of imports, affecting a
real exchange devaluation (0.7%). Devaluation raises the do-
mestic price of agroexports (0.7%) and depresses the relative
price of other agricultural goods (-1.6%). This reallocates re-
sources from other agricultural goods (output falls by 0.4%) to
agroexports (output rises by 0.6%). Finally, the balance of pay-
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ment is restored by increasing agroexports and falling cereal and
industrial good imports. The short-run GNP falls by only a small
percentage (-0.3%).
The social cost, assessed by changes in real income, is dis-
tributed over all social classes. However, small farmers lose since
they predominantly produce animal products for which prices
fall. Larger farmers engaged in agroexports for which prices rise
gain. Due to the small increase in domestic food price, the ur-
ban poor are not significantly hurt.
b. Africa II & Asia: Substitutable Imports
Africa II and Asia I respond very differently from Africa I to
the increase in world food prices. Ceteris paribus, while Africa I
increases agricultural trade through a higher cereals import bill
and increasing agroexports, Africa II reduces trade through cereal
import substitution and declining agroexports. Import substitu-
tion involves substituting cereal imports for domestically pro-
duced food crops.
Owing to substitutability for imports in these regions, the
increase in world cereal prices transmits itself to the entire food
crop sector, increasing domestic producer prices significantly-
prices rise by 5% in Africa II and 8.8% in Asia. The resulting
improvement in terms of trade for agriculture, in sharp contrast to
a worsening in Africa I, induces an increase in domestic food crop
production. Consumers shift consumption from cereals to food
crops. Cereal imports fall significantly-by 24.9% in Africa and
by 76.7% in Asia. The decline in volume of cereal imports, in
exceeding the 20% rise in world prices, facilitates a foreign ex-
change saving and an appreciation of real exchange rates. Re-
source allocation towards food crops for import substitution and
away from agroexports reduces the domestic price and, hence,
production of the latter. Contrary to the scenario in Africa I,
where resources were directed towards cash rather than food
crops, this resource allocation implies a shrinking of interna-
tional trade.
Short-run social cost implications for Asia indicate that large
farmers' real incomes increase sharply (5.2%) as food crop
prices increase by much greater prices than agroexports. Small
farmers and the landless, by contrast, lose (-2.5%) since they are
net buyers of food at a higher price. In Africa II, the large share
of agroexport crops in total agricultural production, for which
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prices fall, and the relatively low increase in food prices induce a
fall in the real incomes of all farmers. Medium farmers, how-
ever, are worst hit (-1.6%) since they are both net buyers and
significant producers of agroexports.
In sum, these simulation results support the argument that
the increase in world food prices resulting from the elimination
of CAP will affect NFIDCs with substitutable imports differently
from those with non-substitutable imports. In particular,
NFIDCs with substitutable imports potentially could benefit
through such liberalization, as follows from the case of Asia and
Africa II, where higher post-liberalization prices boost domestic
agricultural production and self-sufficiency through import sub-
stitution despite a corresponding decline in the share of
agroexports. In countries where imports are non-substitutable
(Africa I), the increase in world prices would affect rising import
bills. The increase in import expenditure, however, could be
counteracted by foreign exchange earned through a corre-
sponding promotion of agroexports. In effect, neither of the
two categories of net-food importing countries would be harmed
by the rise in world prices.
The one repercussion of an increase in world cereal prices
that is common to all regions (Asia, Africa I, and Africa II) is the
fall in real income of the landless and of small and medium-size
farmers. GNP changes, however, are insignificant in all three re-
gions.
In the following section, I discuss how agricultural trade lib-
eralization in the north would impact developing country trade
shares, through effects other than an increase in world agricul-
tural prices.
B. Decrease in Price Instability and Revenue Variability
Protectionist policies in the North transfer price instability
onto world food markets. Most industrialized countries hold
their domestic prices constant despite changes in world prices.
A shortfall in world food output should increase food prices in
all countries worldwide. Many industrialized countries, however,
do not allow domestic prices to rise so domestic demand does
not fall. A rationing of declining world output, therefore, would
require an even greater increase in world prices. Other coun-
tries, in effect, would have to reduce their consumption dispro-
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portionately 4 These repercussions affect developing countries
to an even greater extent due to their strong dependence on
agricultural products and narrow range of exports. Under CAP
for instance, "increased production within a protected home
market requires exports to off load surplus stocks onto the world
market," thereby increasing price instability. "As EEC exports
have increased, price stability in Europe has been bought at the
expense of greater instability on world markets. '35 Such instabil-
ity enhances production risks for developing country exporters,
discouraging investment and, in effect, future productivity.
Agricultural trade liberalization could reduce the variance
of world commodity prices considerably by allowing shortages
and gluts to be smoothed over by a larger number of agents.
Furthermore, liberalization by industrialized countries would re-
duce the price variability of all the major temperate-zone com-
modities. Variance of wheat prices would fall by 33%, while the
variance of sugar prices would fall by 15%.36
Trade liberalization in agriculture could significantly boost
world output and reduce world prices by reducing price variabil-
ity, since the current levels of variability discourage agricultural
production significantly. The decline in world prices would ben-
efit net-food importing developing countries. In fact, the com-
bined effect of higher food prices and lower variability following
liberalization would stimulate agricultural production in devel-
oping countries enough to reverse the trend of the fall in their
GDP induced by such liberalization in the first place.
C. Decrease in Dead Weight Loss
The annual domestic cost of agricultural supports is ex-
tremely high for most industrialized countries. Bale and Lutz
showed the heavy penalties for France, Germany, and Japan. 7
In Japan's case, almost 0.8% of its GNP may have been wasted by
agricultural intervention-some 1.4% of GNP being sacrificed
by consumers to grant producer welfare increases of about 0.5%.
Thus, for every US$1 gained by producers, consumers lose
34. See WORLD BANK, AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1986).
35. See Roarty, supra note 20.
36. See World Development Report, supra note 34.
37. Malcolm D. Bale & Ernest Lutz, Price Distortions in Agriculture and their Effects:
An International Comparison, 63 AM. J. oF AGRIC. ECON. 8, 22 (1981).
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nearly US$3. With a decrease in dead weight loss following liber-
alization, the costs avoided in terms of GNP could be directed
towards the purchase of exports from net-food importing coun-
tries.
Tyers and Anderson estimate gains from avoided dead
weight loss for the OECD to be US$50,000,000,000. They rec-
ommend that at least part of this gain should be short-run food
aid to compensate low-income groups in developing countries
that lose from agricultural trade liberalization in the North.
They estimate that the food aid cost would represent only 1.5%
of this gain, which is unambiguously an affordable figure for in-
dustrialized countries.
IV. WO DISCIPLINES ON EXPORT SUBSIDIES AND
THEIR IMPLEMENTATION
The proliferation of export subsidies in agriculture before
the Uruguay Round went unchecked. GATT 1947 allowed coun-
tries to use export subsidies on agricultural primary products,
although it prohibited export subsidies on industrial products.
Article XVI of GATT provided that agricultural export subsidies
should not be used to capture more than an "equitable share" of
world exports of the product concerned. This, however, was not
effective. The Uruguay Round negotiations resulted in better-
defined rules on export subsidies, as provided in Article 9 of the
Agreement on Agriculture38 ("Agreement").
Despite Uruguay Round initiatives, agriculture continues to
38. See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, art.
9, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal_e/final_e.htm [hereinafter Agreement
on Agriculture]. The right to use export subsidies is now limited to four situations: (i)
export subsidies subject to product-specific reduction commitments within the limits
specified in the schedule of the WTO Member concerned; (ii) any excess of budgetary
outlays for export subsidies or subsidized export volume over the limits specified in the
schedule which is covered by the "downstream flexibility" provision of Article 9.2(b) of
the Agreement on Agriculture; (iii) export subsidies consistent with the special and
differential treatment provision for developing country Members (Article 9.4 of the
Agreement); and (iv) export subsidies other than those subject to reduction commit-
ments provided that they are in conformity with the anti-circumvention disciplines of
Article 10 of the Agreement on Agriculture. In all other cases, the use of export subsi-
dies for agricultural products is prohibited. See Agreement on Agriculture art. 3.3, 8,
10. Developed country Members are required to reduce, in equal annual steps over a
period of six years, the base-period volume of subsidized exports by 21% and the corre-
sponding budgetary outlays for export subsidies by 36%. In the case of developing
country Members, the required cuts are 14% over 10 years with respect to volumes, and
24% over the same period with respect to budgetary outlays.
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remain by far the most distorted sector in international trade.
An assessment of the implementation of the Agreement within
the on-going negotiations of the WTO's Committee on Agricul-
ture illustrates that the largest distortions of trade in agricultural
products still arise out of industrialized country subsidization
practices. 9 The committed reduction in subsidies by industrial-
ized countries, as discussed above, was supposed to affect an in-
crease in world prices of agricultural commodities. OECD data,
however, shows that the current levels of support to farmers in
industrialized countries are no different than the high levels ex-
isting before the end of the Uruguay Round.4" It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the prices of most agricultural commodities
have been declining. In 1998, prices of most non-fuel commodi-
ties fell sharply by 15%.41 A recent paper by the WTO secretariat
illustrates that the level of world price for wheat in 2000, for in-
stance, is no higher than that in the late 1980s.42 Given insignifi-
cant reduction in subsidies by industrialized countries, there has
not been much change in the pattern of world cereal produc-
tion and exports. The expected shift in cereal production from
highly subsidized regions to low-subsidized or non-subsidized re-
gions, therefore, remains a theoretical exercise.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
It is evident that the current WTO obligations of industrial-
ized countries to reduce domestic support and export subsidies
are not stringent enough to lead to the expected rise in prices
and shift in patterns of agricultural production. Such changes
will occur only through a complete elimination, rather than a
limited reduction, of such subsidies. In the short-run, this could
lead to a fall in the real income of net-buyers of food in NFIDCs.
Any ensuing short-term harmful effects for NFIDCs and LDCs
are envisioned as being dealt with under the Marrakesh "Deci-
39. Rod Tyers & Kym Anderson, The Price, Trade and Welfare Effects of Agricultural
Protection in the Uruguay Round, in Kym ANDERSON & YUJIRo HAYAMI, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION: EAST ASIA IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 50-
62 (1986).
40. WfO Negoitations on Agriculture Carins Group Negotiating Proposal, Special Ses-
sion, Committee on Agriculture, G/AG/NG/W/35 (Sept. 22, 2000).
41. See Statement by India, Second Special Session, Committee on Agriculture, G/
AG/NG/w/33 (July 13, 2000).
42. Agricultural Trade Performance by Developing Countries-1990-1998, Special Ses-
sion, Committee on Agriculture, G/AG/NG/S/6 (May 23, 2000)
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sion on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of
the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Im-
porting Developing Countries" ("Decision"). The Decision, ar-
rived at in 1993, sets out objectives with regard to the provision
of food aid, the provision of basic foodstuffs in full grant form
and aid for agricultural development to NFIDCs and LDCs. It
also refers to the possibility of assistance from the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank with respect to the short-
term financing of commercial food imports.
The perception that NFIDCs could only lose from a removal
of industrialized-country subsidies is wrong. On the basis of the
given graphical analysis and simulation results,43 it is concluded
that net-food importing developing countries could benefit from a
subsidy-removal induced rise in agricultural prices if they elimi-
nate their agriculture-taxing domestic policies and, where possi-
ble, allow domestic production to substitute for imports. The
results illustrate how higher world agricultural prices would en-
courage the production of food crops for import substitution in
NFIDCs where imports compete with domestic produce. Furthermore,
the increase in domestic production of import-competitive food
crops, in fact, could provide such countries the possibility to be-
gin exporting what they were initially importing. The most im-
portant policy implication for countries with the capability of im-
port substitution, therefore, is to increase their elasticity of ce-
real supply as rapidly as possible." Developing countries whose
imports are non-competitive with domestic production, by con-
trast, should promote agricultural exports, that is, they should
specialize further in what they do best and continue importing
for the rest.
Developing countries on the whole, regardless of whether
they are net-food importers or net-food exporters would benefit
from a removal of subsidies in industrialized countries. Full ben-
efits, however, would result only from a complete elimination of
such subsidies-a tall order given what WTO rules currently re-
quire. It remains, nevertheless, an order that developing coun-
tries are vigorously fighting for in the on-going agriculture nego-
tiations, and one that they will continue to strive for in pursuit of
"fair" trade.
43. See Sadoulet & de Janvry, supra note 2.
44. Id.
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